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1. Introduction 
The concept of information has acquired a strikingly prominent role in contemporary 
biology. This trend is especially marked within genetics, but it has also become important 
in other areas, such as evolutionary theory and developmental biology, particularly where 
these fields border on genetics. The most distinctive biological role for informational 
concepts, and the one that has generated the most discussion, is in the description of the 
relations between genes and the various structures and processes that genes play a role in 
causing. For many biologists, the causal role of genes should be understood in terms of 
their carrying information about their various products. That information might require 
the cooperation of various environmental factors before it can be "expressed," but the 
same can be said of other kinds of message. 
  An initial response might be to think that this mode of description is entirely 
anchored in a set of well-established facts about the role of DNA and RNA within protein 
synthesis, summarized in the familiar chart representing the "genetic code," mapping 
DNA base triplets to amino acids. However, informational enthusiasm in biology pre-
dates even a rudimentary understanding of these mechanisms (Schrodinger 1944). And 
more importantly, current applications of informational concepts extend far beyond 
anything that can receive an obvious justification in terms of the familiar facts about the 
specification of protein molecules by DNA. This includes: 
 2 
(i) The description of whole-organism phenotypic traits (including complex behavioral 
traits) as specified or coded for by information contained in the genes, 
(ii) The treatment of many causal processes within cells, and perhaps of the whole-
organism developmental sequence, in terms of the execution of a program stored in the 
genes, 
(iii) The idea that genes themselves, for the purpose of evolutionary theorizing, should be 
seen as, in some sense, "made" of information. From this point of view, information 
becomes a fundamental ingredient in the biological world.  
 
There is no consensus about the proper form and status of these kinds of description, and 
the result has been the development of a foundational discussion within both biology and 
the philosophy of biology. Some have hailed the employment of informational concepts 
here as a crucial advance (Williams 1992). Others have seen almost every biological 
application of informational concepts as a serious error, one that distorts our 
understanding and contributes to lingering genetic determinism (Francis 2003). Most of 
the possible options between these extreme views have also been defended. These 
include various arguments that some, though not all, of the popular uses of informational 
concepts in biology are legitimate (Godfrey-Smith 2000, Griffiths 2001). They also 
include arguments that even the more tendentious uses of these concepts are legitimate so 
long as the concepts are applied consistently (Sterelny, Smith, and Dickison 1996, 
Jablonka 2002). Other philosophers and biologists regard the whole matter as a storm in a 
teacup; they do not think that the development of an informational language for 
describing genes makes much of a difference to anything, as it is obviously a loose 
metaphorical usage that carries no real theoretical weight (Kitcher 2001).  
  The philosophical discussion has developed for two reasons. One is the general 
philosophical interest in abstract conceptual problems in particular areas of science – an 
interest in debates that seem resistant to empirical adjudication, but do not seem merely 
terminological. So some philosophical interest here is akin to more familiar philosophical 
attention to such biological concepts as fitness, species, and natural selection. But the 
concept of information is not merely an ordinary theoretical concept within a particular 
part of science. It is also part of a family of concepts that has been the focus of intense 3 
study in several parts of philosophy, stretching back for centuries. "Information" itself 
does not have a long history in philosophy, but it is closely related to concepts that do, 
such as the concept of meaning, which is central to philosophy of language and much 
philosophy of mind. So philosophers are familiar with the kinds of puzzles that are 
generated by this family of "semantic" concepts. It is not that philosophers have 
developed a consensus theory that can be applied, in an off-the-shelf way, to new cases. 
But philosophers are intimately acquainted with many of the puzzles, twists and turns,  
red herrings, and trade-offs that arise in this area. So as information (and related 
concepts) have become more prominent in biology, some philosophers have thought that 
this is an area where they are qualified to help in the development of useful and coherent 
biological concepts.  
  This paper has two main sections. The next section gives an outline of some of the 
arguments and options developed to date. The third section then develops some more 
novel ideas, which are presented in a cautious and exploratory way. 
  Before moving to the survey section, there are two other preliminary points to 
make. First, the topic of this paper is not the role of the concepts of information and 
representation in the parts of biology where they are most obviously relevant; the paper is 
not concerned with neuroscience, perception, language-processing, and so on. The topic 
of this paper is the role of information (and its relatives) in parts of biology where its role 
is less obvious, such as the description of genes, hormones, and (to some extent) 
signaling systems at the cellular level. Secondly, in the early part of this discussion I will 
not put much emphasis on some of the finer distinctions between the concepts of 
information, representation, meaning, coding, and so on. As the paper goes on, 
distinctions between concepts within this family will become more important, but some 
of the subtle distinctions will be backgrounded initially. 
 
 
2. Outline of the debate  
One common way to start organizing the problem is to make a distinction between two 
senses of "information," or two kinds of application of informational concepts. One of 
these is a weak or minimal sense, and the other is stronger and more controversial. In the 4 
weaker sense, informational connections between events or variables involve no more 
than ordinary correlations (or perhaps correlations that are "non-accidental" in some 
physical sense involving causation or natural laws). This sense of information is 
associated with Claude Shannon (1948), who showed how the concept of information 
could be used to quantify facts about contingency and correlation in a useful way, 
initially for communication technology. For Shannon, anything is a source of information 
if it has a number of alternative states that might be realized on a particular occasion. And 
any other variable carries information about the source if its state is correlated with that 
of the source. This is a matter of degree; a signal carries more information about a source 
if its state is a better predictor of the source, less information if it is a worse predictor. 
  This way of thinking about contingency and correlation has turned out to be 
useful in many areas outside of the original technological applications that Shannon had 
in mind, and genetics is one example. There are interesting questions that can be asked 
about this sense of information (Dretske 1981), but the initially important point is that 
when a biologist introduces information in this sense to a description of gene action or 
other processes, she is not introducing some new and special kind of relation or property. 
She is just adopting a particular quantitative framework for describing ordinary 
correlations or causal connections.  
  Consequently, philosophical discussions have sometimes set the issue up by 
saying that there is one kind of "information" appealed to in biology, Shannon's kind, that 
is unproblematic and does not require much philosophical attention. The term "causal" 
information is sometimes used to refer to this kind, though this term is not ideal. 
Whatever it is called, this kind of information exists whenever there is ordinary 
contingency and correlation. So we can say that genes contain information about the 
proteins they make, and also that genes contain information about the whole-organism 
phenotype. But when we say that, we are saying no more than what we are saying when 
we say that there is an informational connection between smoke and fire, or between tree 
rings and a tree's age. The more contentious question then becomes whether or not 
biology needs another, richer concept of information as well as Shannon's concept. 
Information in this richer sense is sometimes called "semantic" or "intentional" 
information. 5 
  What is the difference between them, and why might we think that biology needs 
to employ a richer concept? There is a range of differences between the two. First and 
most importantly, informational connections in the Shannon sense connect environmental 
conditions with biological traits in the same way that they connect genes and those traits. 
With respect to Shannon information, there is what Griffiths and Gray call a "parity" 
between the roles of environmental and genetic causes (Griffiths and Gray 1994, Griffiths 
2001). In addition, information in the Shannon sense "flows" in both directions, as it 
involves no more than learning about the state of one variable by attending to another. So 
we can read off something about the phenotype from the state of the genes, but we can 
also learn something about the genes by attending to the phenotype.  
  Some talk about information in biology is consistent with these features of 
Shannon information, but some is not. It is usually thought that at least some applications 
of informational language to genes is supposed to ascribe to genes a special kind of 
causal property that is not ascribed to environmental conditions, even when they are 
causally important, and that is also uni-directional.  
  In addition, a message that carries "semantic information," it is often thought, has 
the capacity to mis-represent, as well as accurately represent, what it is about. There is a 
capacity for error. Shannon information does not have that feature; we cannot say that 
some variable carried false information about another, if we are using the original 
Shannon sense of the term. But biologists do apparently want to use language of that kind 
when talking about genes. Genes carry a message that is supposed to be expressed, 
whether or not it actually is expressed. 
  Once we take the alleged semantic properties of genes as seriously as this, some 
subtle questions arise. If genes are carrying a message in this sense, the message 
apparently has a prescriptive or imperative content, as opposed to a descriptive or 
indicative one. Genes contain instructions, not descriptions. Their "direction of fit" to 
their effects is such that if genes and phenotype do not match, what we have is a case of 
unfulfilled instructions rather than inaccurate descriptions.  
  Several philosophers and biologists have argued that much informational talk 
about genes uses a richer concept than Shannon's, but this concept can be given a 
naturalistic analysis. It is not a lapse back into unscientific teleological thinking. One way 6 
to proceed is to make use of a rich concept of biological function, in which the function 
of an entity derives from a history of natural selection (Sterelny, Smith, and Dickison 
1996, Maynard Smith 2000, Shea forthcoming). This sort of move is familiar from the 
philosophy of mind, where similar problems arose in the explanation of the semantic 
properties of mental states. When an entity has been subject to and shaped by a history of 
natural selection, this can provide the grounding for a kind of purposive or normative 
description of the causal capacities of that entity. To use the standard example (Wright 
1976), the function of a heart is to pump blood, not to make thumping sounds, because it 
is the former effect that has led to hearts being favored by natural selection. The hope is 
that a similar "teleofunctional" strategy might help make sense of the semantic properties 
of genes, and perhaps other biological structures with semantic properties.  
  There are several ways in which the details of such an account might be 
developed (Godfrey-Smith 1999), some focusing on the evolved functions of the genetic 
machinery as a whole, and others on the natural selection of particular genetic elements. 
All versions of this idea offered so far have problems of detail. One problem is that there 
is no overall connection between biological function and semantic properties; having a 
function in the rich historical sense is not generally sufficient for having semantic 
properties. Legs are for walking, but they do not represent walking. Enzymes are for 
catalyzing reactions, but they do not instruct this activity. There are things that legs and 
enzymes are supposed to do, but this does not make them into information-carriers, in a 
rich beyond-Shannon sense. Why should it do so for genes? 
  Sterelny, Smith and Dickison seem to think there is a quite intimate connection 
between evolutionary function and semantic properties in the case of biological structures 
that have been selected to play a causal role in developmental processes. They argue that 
genes, in virtue of these functional properties, represent the outcomes they are supposed 
to produce. They add, however, that any non-genetic factors that have a similar 
developmental role, and have been selected to play that role, also have semantic 
properties. So Sterelny, Smith and Dickison want to ascribe very rich semantic properties 
to genes, but not only to genes. Some non-genetic factors have the same status.  
  Proposals that appeal to evolutionary design to "enrich" the informational 
properties of genes have problems of detail, but they also have attractive features. It is 7 
striking that John Maynard Smith, when he came to grapple with the status of his 
enthusiasm for informational concepts in biology, opted for something along these lines 
(2000). The resulting overall picture has good structural features. We would have a loose, 
uncontroversial Shannon sense of information that applies to all sorts of correlations, and 
an "overlay" of richer semantic properties in cases where we have the right kind of 
history of natural selection. Genes and a handful of non-genetic factors would have these 
properties; most environmental features that have a causal role in development would 
not. The neatness of the resulting picture provides, for some people, good reason to 
persevere with some account along these lines.  
  So far in this section I have mostly discussed the concept of information; there has 
not been much talk of "coding." And the ideas discussed so far do not put any emphasis 
on the special features of genetic mechanisms themselves, such as the combinatorial 
structure of the "genetic code." But surely these features of genetic mechanisms provide 
much of the underlying motivation for the introduction of semantic concepts into 
biology? It might seem so, but a lot of discussions have in effect treated this as an open 
question. As noted above, the enthusiasm for semantic characterization of biological 
structures extends back before the genetic code was discovered. (See Kay 2000 for a 
detailed historical treatment.) But another line of thought in the literature, overlapping 
with the ideas above, has focused on the special features of genetic mechanisms, and on 
the idea of "genetic coding" as a contingent feature of these mechanisms.  
  Both I (2000) and Griffiths (2001) have argued that there is one highly restricted 
use of a fairly rich semantic language within genetics that is justified. This is the idea that 
genes "code for" the amino acid sequence of protein molecules, in virtue of the peculiar 
and contingent features of the "transcription and translation" mechanisms found within 
cells. Genes specify amino acid sequence via a templating process, that involves a regular 
mapping rule between two quite different kinds of molecules (nucleic acid bases and 
amino acids). This mapping rule is combinatorial, and apparently arbitrary (in a sense 
that is hard to make precise – Stegmann 2004).  
  The argument is that these features make gene expression into a causal process 
that has significant analogies to various paradigmatic symbolic phenomena, such as the 
use of natural language. Some have argued that this analogy becomes questionable once 8 
we move from the genetics of simple prokaryotic organisms (bacteria), to those in 
eukaryotic cells. This has been a theme of Sarkar's work (1996). Mainstream biology 
tends to regard the complications that arise in the case of eukaryotes as mere details, that 
do not compromise the basic picture we have of how gene expression works. An example 
is the editing and "splicing" of mRNA transcripts into a processed mRNA that is used in 
translation. This is a biologically important process, and it does make the DNA a much 
less straightforward predictor of amino acid sequence, but it can be argued that this does 
not much affect the crucial features of gene expression mechanisms that motivate the 
introduction of a symbolic or semantic mode of description.  
  So the argument in Godfrey-Smith (2000) and Griffiths (2001) is that there is one 
kind of informational or semantic property that genes and only genes have: coding for the 
amino acid sequences of protein molecules. But this relation "reaches" only as far as the 
amino acid sequence. It does not vindicate the idea that genes code for whole-organism 
phenotypes, let alone provide a basis for the wholesale use of informational or semantic 
language in biology. Genes can have a reliable causal role in the production of a whole-
organism phenotype, of course. But if this causal relation is to be described in 
informational terms, then it is a matter of ordinary Shannon information, which applies to 
environmental factors as well. This restriction of semantic language to the first steps in 
the causal chain in protein synthesis is essentially along the same lines as Crick's (1958) 
view. 
  In this section I have distinguished one line of thought that looks at Shannon 
information and its "enriched" relatives, and another line of thought that looks at the 
peculiar features of the mechanisms of gene expression, and the original narrow idea of a 
"genetic code." But the two lines of thought can be married in various ways. Maynard 
Smith, in response to problems with his teleo-functional account, appealed at one point to 
some special features of genetic mechanisms, including the apparent "arbitrariness" of the 
genetic code. This idea has been popular but is hard to make precise. The key problem is 
that any causal relation can look "arbitrary" if it operates via many intervening links. 
There is nothing "arbitrary" about the proximal mechanisms by which a molecular 
binding event occurs. What makes the genetic code seem "arbitrary" is the fact that the 
mapping between base triplets and amino acids is mediated by contingent features of the 9 
sequences of tRNA molecules, and of the enzymes that bind amino acids to tRNA 
molecules. Because we often focus on the "long-distance" connection between DNA and 
protein, and pay less attention to the intervening mechanisms, the causal relation appears 
arbitrary. If we picked out and focused on steps in any other biological cascade that are 
separated by three or four intervening links, the causal relation would look just as 
"arbitrary." Here it is also significant that the standard genetic code is turning out to have 
more systematic and non-accidental structure than people had once supposed (Knight, 
Freeland, and Landweber 1999).  
  I will discuss three more topics, in a more self-contained way, to finish the 
survey. The first is the idea that genes contain a program, in a sense analogous to that in 
computer science (Mayr 1961, Jacob and Monod 1961, Moss 1992, Marcus 2004). This 
idea has not been discussed in such a concerted way by philosophers, though it is seen 
constantly in biological discussion. Here the focus is more on the control of processes by 
genes, as opposed to the specification of a particular product.  
  The "program" concept seems to be applied in biology in an especially broad and 
unconstrained way, often guided only by very vague analogies with computers and their 
workings. First, we might isolate a very broad usage, in which talk of programming 
seems merely aimed at referring to the intricate but orderly and well-coordinated nature 
of many basic processes in biological systems. Here, the most that talk of "programs" 
could be doing is indicating the role of evolutionary design. An example might be talk of 
"programmed cell death" in neuroscience, which is a very important process within 
neural development that could just as accurately be described as "orderly and adaptive 
cell-death in accordance with evolutionary design."  
  Secondly, however, we might isolate a sense in which talk of "programs" in 
biology is driven by a close analogy between some biological process and the low-level 
operation of modern computers. One crucial kind of causal process within cells is 
cascades of up and down-regulation in genetic networks. One gene will make a product 
that binds to and hence down-regulates another gene, which is then prevented from 
making a product that up-regulates another... and so on. What we have here is a cascade 
of events that can sometimes be described in terms of Boolean relationships between 
variables. One event might only follow from the conjunction of another two, or from a 10 
disjunction of them. Down-regulation is a kind of negation, and there can be double and 
triple negations in a network. Gene regulation networks have a rich enough structure of 
this kind for it to make sense to think of them as engaged in a kind of computation. 
Computer chip "and-gates," neural "and-gates" and genetic "and-gates" have some 
genuine similarities. Most other biological processes, though just as much the product of 
evolutionary design, do not have a structure that motivates this sort of computational 
description. And once again we find, as in the case of "genetic coding," that the domain 
in which this computational language is well-motivated, when applied to genes, is 
confined to the cellular level. Less elaborate cascades of this kind can also be found in 
the endocrinological (hormone-using) systems within the body. Here too, informational 
language can seem naturally applicable, and may be justified by a similar line of 
argument. 
  The second of the three topics I will discuss to finish this section is the link 
between informational description and genetic determinism. A number of critics have 
argued that the informational or semantic perspective on gene action fosters or 
encourages naive ideas about genetic determinism (Oyama 1985, Griffiths 2001). Others 
think that genetic determinism, when it is false, is an ordinary error about causal relations 
that has no particular link to the informational description of those relations. I side with 
the critics here, who say that there is something definite about informational description 
of genes that encourages fallacies about genetic causation. The key point has been 
summarized by Griffiths. He notes that in complex systems, almost all causal factors are 
context-dependent, and usually it is not hard to remember this. If we think in ordinary 
causal terms, it is straightforward to note that a genetic cause will only have its normal 
effects if accompanied by suitable environmental conditions, and an environmental cause 
will only have its normal effect if accompanied by suitable genetic conditions. (If the 
sensitivity on either side is high, then talk of "normal" effects itself may be misleading.) 
But, Griffiths suggests, the informational mode of describing genes (and other factors) 
fosters the appearance of context-independence. "Genetic causation is interpreted 
deterministically because genes are thought to be a special kind of cause. Genes are 
instructions – they provide information – whilst other causal factors are merely 
material.... A gay gene is an instruction to be gay even when [because of other factors] 11 
the person is straight" (2001, pp. 395-96). So the idea is that the inferential habits and 
associations that tend to go along with the use of informational or semantic concepts lead 
us to think of genes as having an additional and subtle kind of extra causal specificity. 
These habits can have an effect even when people are willing to overtly accept context-
dependence of (most) causes in complex biological systems. Relatedly, the idea of 
internal genetic messages may also foster a tendency towards a kind of essentialist 
thinking; the meaning of the internal message tells us what the "true nature" of the 
organism is, regardless of whether this nature is actually manifested.  
  My final topic in this survey is the most strong and tendentious employment of 
informational language for genes, which arises in the context of evolutionary biology. It 
has been common for some time to say that, in the evolutionary context, we should think 
of a gene in terms of its sequence, which is preserved over many replication events, and 
not in terms of particular DNA molecules, which come and go (Dawkins 1976, 1986). 
The idea that sequence can be preserved across changes in the underlying molecules is 
certainly reasonable and important. But this message, important as it is, has been 
expressed in extreme and philosophically mysterious ways by some theorists. G. C. 
Williams (1992), for example, holds that because of these facts about the preservation of 
gene sequence across changes in molecules, we should think of information as a kind of 
fundamental ingredient of the universe, along with mass and energy, that exists in its own 
"domain." This makes the causal connections between the informational domain and the 
ordinary physical domain quite mysterious, and Williams himself finds this an important 
problem. But the appearance of a problem arises only from an unnecessary reification of 
information. We can instead say that what has been learned from work on the 
evolutionary features of genes is that various different physical objects can share their 
informational properties. These informational properties are explicable in terms of the 
lower-level physical properties of the objects, and the contexts in which the objects are 
embedded. Such a view does raise some further questions, but it does not introduce the 
idea of information as a separate "stuff" whose relations to ordinary physical things are 
tenuous and problematic. 
  The enthusiasm for a reified treatment of information can lead to a other 
theoretical problems in biology. Some of the recent advocates of "intelligent design" 12 
creationism have tried to use the special and mysterious properties of information to 
mount anti-Darwinian arguments (Dembski 2001, criticized in Godfrey-Smith 2001). 
These arguments have no real force. Indeed, the resulting views tend to less plausible 
than earlier versions of the argument from design, because even routine and low-level 
forms of evolution by natural selection, such as the evolution of drug-resistance in 
bacteria, tend to be ruled out as impossible in principle. But the informational 
terminology in which the arguments are expressed lends them a spurious appearance of 
rigor.  
 
 
3. The Next Steps? 
In this section I will cautiously introduce some ideas that approach the whole problem 
somewhat differently. I will motivate the change in tack by asking what looks like an odd 
question. Is the informational or semantic description of genes metaphorical, or not? This 
should be an easy question to answer, but in fact seems to be surrounded by uncertainty. 
On the one hand, biologists sometimes say that the introduction of an informational 
framework was a crucial theoretical advance. This suggests that it is not at all a metaphor. 
If electrical charge, and entropy, were crucial theoretical advances in their day, it was not 
by being metaphors. But if one presses hard on what these informational properties are 
supposed to be, especially once we get beyond the simple idea of a combinatorial 
mapping from nucleic acids to amino acids, it is common to encounter a retreat to the 
idea of genetic information as a metaphor. It is not literally true that genes are 
programming development or representing the whole-organism phenotype, but this is a 
metaphor that has proven invaluable to biology. 
  Of course, we have to expect some vagueness here. And we can't expect 
biologists to be experts on the analysis of literal and non-literal language. But what 
makes the situation odd is the fact that if someone tried to carefully adjudicate this 
question, they would run immediately into the fact that in the case of ascriptions of 
semantic properties, there is no clear and well-understood border between literal and 
metaphorical. There is not a clear and well-demarcated sense of what the literal domain 
is, to which metaphorical cases are being compared.  13 
  The same problem arises, to some extent, in cognitive science, which is often 
based on the idea that the mind/brain can be seen as a computer. Does this mean: there is 
such a thing as computation, and the brain literally does it? Or is the idea of neural 
computation something more like a metaphor? The abstract theory of computation, within 
mathematics, is not especially helpful for answering this question (Smith 2002).  
  In the case of computation in cognitive science, the question can deflected 
initially by saying that computation is being treated as a "model" for the mind. But the 
term "model" is so ambiguous that this does not help much. Sometimes "model" means a 
provisional and cautiously defended theory. This does not help here because caution is 
not the issue. We want to know whether information-processing, computation, 
representation (etc.) are real natural kinds that brain activity – and genetic activity – 
might be literal instances of, or whether some other story about the role of these concepts 
has to be told. 
  In the remainder of this section I will sketch one alternative story of this kind. It is 
designed to contrast with the simpler idea that informational properties are definite but 
elusive properties that genes either do or do not have. Instead, informational description 
of genes is motivated by a family of factors, which I will group into three categories. 
First, it is motivated by some real and uncontroversial features of genes and DNA 
themselves, that would not alone be sufficient to motivate an elaborate informational 
description. Second, the use of informational and semantic language introduces into 
biology a particular "causal schematism," derived from everyday contexts in which 
symbols are used. The schematism functions as a model, in a sense discussed in some 
recent philosophy of science.  
  Thirdly, the informational framework reflects and reinforces a commitment to a 
way of demarcating the scientifically important features of genes and associated 
mechanisms. The framework foregrounds one set of properties and backgrounds another, 
and the properties of genes and other molecules that are being foregrounded are sequence 
properties, as opposed to all their other chemical properties. The result of this analysis is 
an account of the role of informational language in biology that is more focused on the 
entire disciplinary role of the informational framework, and less on specific informational 
properties that might or might not be real. 14 
  I will say more about each of the three categories in turn. First, the informational 
framework is motivated, of course, by some real and uncontroversial features of genes 
and DNA themselves. Some of these were highlighted in previous section, and they 
include the combinatorial structure and regularity of the mapping rule from nucleic acids 
to amino acids. But some motivation may also come from a feature of DNA that is not so 
often remarked on in this context. This is the passivity, or comparative inertness, of 
DNA. Here we focus on some facts about what DNA does not do, as well as what it does.  
  The evolution of DNA as a repository of sequence information is often said to be 
due in part to its chemical stability. Origin of life work emphasizes that fact that RNA is a 
good initial replicator molecule because it has some enzymatic activity, but DNA is more 
stable once proteins have been developed for enzymatic work. And in modern cells, DNA 
does not do very much in chemical terms; almost of all its effects go via a particular 
indirect causal pathway by which DNA sequence is transcribed and translated. (The main 
exception to this is DNA's direct interaction with transcription factors, in gene 
regulation.) Proteins, as is always noted, do most of the actual chemical work in the cell. 
DNA specifies amino acid sequence, and does not do much else. So to call DNA an 
"informational" molecule, in a modern context, is often a gesture towards what it does not 
do, as well as to what it does.  
  My suggestion for a second set of motivations is more tendentious. It involves a 
general analysis of when and why people introduce semantic concepts (including 
information) into scientific and other explanatory contexts. The suggestion is that the use 
of these concepts is generally guided – not always consciously – by the postulation of an 
analogy between a particular everyday form of symbol use, and the domain that the 
theorist is trying to understand. This analogy can be very partial, while still exerting 
influence on how the phenomena are described and understood. 
  How does the analogy work? A central aspect of everyday symbol use is that one 
object is used to "stand for" another. More precisely, a person guides behavior directed 
on one object or domain by attending to the state of another. This is the schematic core of 
everyday symbol use, and it shows up abstractly in many philosophical analysis of 
semantic phenomena (eg., Millikan 1984), as well as in models of signaling games and 
the evolution of meaning (Skyrms 1996). This basic pattern is also installed in the basic 15 
picture that Shannon used in his theory of information: we have a source, and a signal 
whose state can be consulted to learn something about the source. 
  A central feature of this "causal schematism" is the distinction between some 
mechanism that reads or consumes the signal, and the signal itself. In genetic case, the 
idea that semantic description is guided by this model is quite helpful. First, we see that 
the basic cell-level machinery of transcription and translation is, in fact, a fairly good 
instance of the schematic structure in question. The ribosomal/tRNA machinery is, in 
effect, a reader or consumer of nucleic acid sequence, with the function of creating 
protein products that will have a variety of uses elsewhere in the cell. We also see that 
this realization of the causal schematism only applies at the cell level, at the level at 
which the transcription and translation apparatus shows up as a definite part of the 
machinery. So we see why it is true – if it is true, as I think it is – that the use of 
informational or semantic language in explaining how protein molecules are made is 
legitimate and well-motivated, while the use of this language when talking about the role 
of genes in producing whole-organism phenotypes is not. Once we think in terms of the 
influence of analogy and a causal schematism here, we can also note a connection to the 
discussion of the comparative chemical "passivity" of DNA discussed earlier in this 
section. Paradigmatic cases of messages in everyday life are rather physically passive, 
too, having their significant effects only via their interpretation by a reader or consumer. 
  This second category of factors motivating informational description of genes 
involves a kind of model-based theorizing, in a sense that was developed for the analysis 
of very different parts of science (Giere 1988, Godfrey-Smith forthcoming, Weisberg 
forthcoming). The term "model" gives us some definite purchase here after all. 
  My third category involves a role for the informational framework that is not part 
of a causal hypothesis, a posited mechanism, or anything of that kind. Instead, it involves 
a commitment to a way of demarcating and categorizing an entire domain. Via the 
informational framework, a commitment is made to the importance of one set of 
properties and the unimportance of another. One set of properties of biological molecules 
is foregrounded, by introduction of a language that can naturally accommodate them, 
while another set of properties is backgrounded. What is being foregrounded is sequence 
properties, as objects of study, as opposed to all the other chemical properties of genes 16 
and associated biological molecules. The suggestion is that rather than attributing some 
particular causal powers to DNA sequence, the informational framework often functions 
to make sequences in general the primary focus of study. What results is a form of 
abstraction akin to that seen in statistical mechanics; there is a focus on a distinctive level 
of description and a particular set of statistical features of interactions between particles, 
abstracting away from lots of other properties (Griesemer 2005). The informational 
framework also brings with it a set of conceptual tools that are suited for the analysis of 
sequence properties, as opposed to other chemical properties. However, it should be 
added here that there are conspicuous uses of informational language in biology in 
contexts where sequence properties are not treated as central, for example in the 
description of hormonal signaling. In these cases I would emphasize the second of the 
three factors discussed in this section, the role of a causal schematism derived from 
public symbol use.  
  Suppose the actual patterns of use of informational language in genetics are in 
fact guided by factors like these, in a context-sensitive mixture. The use of the 
informational framework is guided by some real features of genetic mechanisms, but also 
by application of an schematic causal model that guides many or most uses of semantic 
language. It reflects and reinforces a general disciplinary focus on sequence properties as 
opposed to others. This would steer us away from the idea that there is some definite but 
hidden set of properties being posited by such language, that might or might not be real. I 
will leave somewhat open how this set of ideas relates to the more standard lines of 
thought outlined in the previous section. In some ways, the two can complement each 
other. In other ways, there is probably some tension. 
 
 
*       *       * 
 
 
Acknowledgment: I am indebted to Arnon Levy and Nicholas Shea for comments and 
discussion of these issues. 
 17 
 
References 
Crick, F. (1958). "On Protein Synthesis." Symposia of the Society for Experimental 
Biology 12: 138-163. 
 
Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dawkins, R. (1986). The Blind Watchmaker. New York: Norton. 
 
Dembski, W. (1997). "Intelligent Design as a Theory of Information." Perspectives on 
Science and Christian Faith 3: 180-190. 
 
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
 
Francis, R. (2003). Why Men Won't Ask for Directions: The Seductions of Sociobiology. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Giere, R. (1988). Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (1999). "Genes and Codes: Lessons from the Philosophy of Mind?" in 
V. Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press. 
 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2000). "On the Theoretical Role of  'Genetic Coding,'" Philosophy of 
Science 67: 26-44. 
 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2001). "Information and the Argument from Design." In R. Pennock 
(ed.), Intelligent Design Creationism and its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and 
Scientific Perspectives. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 575-596. 
 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (forthcoming). "The Strategy of Model-Based Science." To appear in 
Biology and Philosophy. 
 
Griesemer, James. (2005), "The Informational Gene and the Substantial Body: On the 
Generalization of Evolutionary Theory by Abstraction", in M. Jones and N. Cartwright 
(eds.), Idealization XII: Correcting the Model. Idealization and Abstraction in the 
Sciences. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi. 
 
Griffiths, P. E (2001). "Genetic Information: A Metaphor in Search of a Theory," 
Philosophy of Science 68: 394-412.  
 
Griffiths, P. and R. Gray (1994). "Developmental Systems and Evolutionary 
Explanation," Journal of Philosophy 91: 277-304. 
 18 
Jablonka E. (2002) "Information: Its Interpretation, Its Inheritance and Its Sharing." 
Philosophy of Science 69: 578-605. 
 
Jacob, F. and J. Monod (1961). “Genetic Regulatory Mechanisms in the Synthesis of 
Proteins,” Journal of Molecular Biology 3: 318-356. 
 
Kay, L. (2000). Who Wrote the Book of Life? A History of the Genetic Code. Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press. 
 
Kitcher, Philip. S. (2001), "Battling the Undead: How (and How Not) to Resist Genetic 
Determinism", in R. Singh, C. Krimbas, D. Paul and J. Beatty (eds.), Thinking About 
Evolution: Historical, Philosophical and Political Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Knight, R., S. Freeland and L. Landweber (1999). "Selection, History and Chemistry: 
The Three Faces of the Genetic Code." Trends in Biochemical Sciences 24: 241-247. 
 
Marcus, G. (2004). The Birth Of The Mind: How A Tiny Number of Genes Creates the 
Complexities of Human Thought. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Maynard Smith, J. (2000). "The Concept of Information in Biology," Philosophy of 
Science 67: 177-194. 
 
Mayr, E. (1961). "Cause and Effect in Biology." Science 134: 1501-6. 
 
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press. 
 
Moss, Lenny. (1992), "A Kernel of Truth? On the Reality of the Genetic Program", in D. 
Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik (eds.), PSA 1992, Volume 1. East Lansing: Philosophy 
of Science Association, pp. 335-348. 
 
Oyama, S. (1985). The Ontogeny of Information. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Sarkar, S. (1996), "Decoding "Coding" -- Information and DNA." BioScience 46: 857-
864. 
 
Shannon, C. (1948). "A Mathematical Theory of Communication," Bell Systems 
Technical Journal 27: 279-423, 623-656. 
 
Shea, N. (forthcoming). "Representation in the Genome, and Other Inheritance Systems." 
 
Schrödinger, E. (1944/1992). What is Life? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 19 
Skyrms, B. (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Smith, B. (2002) "The Foundations of Computing." In M. Scheutz (ed.), 
Computationalism: New Directions. Cambridge MA: MIT Press 
 
Stegmann, U. (2004). "The Arbitrariness of the Genetic Code." Biology and Philosophy 
19: 205-222. 
 
Sterelny, K., K. Smith and M. Dickison (1996). "The Extended Replicator." Biology and 
Philosophy 11: 377-403. 
 
Weisberg, M. (forthcoming). "Who is a Modeler?" To appear in British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science. 
 
Williams, G. C. (1992). Natural Selection: Levels, Domains, and Challenges. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Wright, L. (1973). "Functions." Philosophical Review 82: 139-168. 
 
 
 